On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet) by Stout, Lynn A.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
Winter 2013
On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its
Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the
Closet)
Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law School, ls483@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stout, Lynn A., "On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet)" (2013).
Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 865.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/865
On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall,
and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet)
Lynn A. Stout*
I. INTRODUCTION: BERLE AND MEANS AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
In their 1932 opus The Modern Corporation and Public Property,
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously documented the evolution of
a new economic entity-the public corporation.' What made the public
corporation "public," of course, was that it had thousands or even hun-
dreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a
small fraction of outstanding shares. As a result, the public firm's share-
holders had little individual incentive to pay close attention to what was
going on inside the firm, or even to vote. Dispersed shareholders were
rationally apathetic. If they voted at all, they usually voted to approve
whatever course of action was recommended by the company's incum-
bent directors, including the re-election of the directors themselves.
The result, as Berle and Means put it, was a "separation of owner-
ship and control" in public firms.'
[T]he position of ownership has changed from that of an active to
that of a passive agent. In place of actual physical properties over
which the owner could exercise direction and for which he was re-
sponsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper representing a set
of rights and expectations with respect to an enterprise. But over the
enterprise and over the physical property-the instruments of pro-
duction-in which he has an interest, the owner has little control.
Distinguished Professor of Corporate and Business Law, Clarke Business Law Institute, Cornell
Law School.
I. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) (rev. ed. 1967).
2. Id. at 6. Bcrle and Means recognized that, as a legal matter, shareholders do not in fact own
corporations, see infra Part IV, but rather have ownership of shares of stock, which are essentially
contracts with the corporate entity that give shareholders only very limited rights, BERLE & MEANS,
supra note I, at 244-45, 305.
3. BERLE & MEANS, supra note I, at 64.
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Berle and Means concluded that "we have reached a condition in which
the individual interest of the shareholder is definitely made subservient to
the will of a controlling group of managers.",
4
Interestingly, Berle and Means were not terribly worried about this
state of affairs. They recognized the possibility that entrenched managers
might try to use their control over the corporate enterprise to serve them-
selves, a problem often described today as the "agency cost" problem.
5
But they also believed there was an alternative to either a private compa-
ny, where a single shareholder or small group of shareholders exercised
real power over the board, and a public corporation, whose unaccounta-
ble managers indulged in "corporate plundering.",
6
As Berle and Means explained,
This third alternative offers a wholly new concept of corporate ac-
tivity. Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can
stand against the paramount interests of the community .... Should
the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program comprising
fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public,
and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of
the profits from the owners of passive property ... the interests of
passive property owners would have to give way .... It is conceiva-
ble-indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to
survive-that the "control" of the great corporations should develop
into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by
various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of
the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private
cupidity.
7
II. THE MANAGERIALIST ERA
Murray Weidenbaum and Mark Jensen have described The Modern
Corporation and Public Property as "one of those enduring classics that
many cite but few read." This may explain why many contemporary
experts still view as a problem the "separation of ownership and control"
in public companies that Berle and Means merely documented. Most
might be surprised to learn that Berle and Means themselves were not
troubled by shareholder powerlessness in public firms. To the contrary,
while they understood that shareholder weakness might lead to manage-
rial self-dealing, they thought it more likely--"almost essential"-that
4. Id. at 244.
5. Id. at 7; see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man-
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECoN. 305 (1976).
6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note I, at 311.
7. Id. at 312-13.
8. Id. at ix.
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professional managers (Berle and Means's "technocrats") would run
public firms in the interests of not just shareholders, but also employees,
consumers, and the broader society.
History suggests that Berle and Means's 1932 prediction proved
largely correct. For the next half-century, boards and executives of public
corporations embraced a philosophy that has been called "managerial
capitalism" or "managerialism." 9 Rather than seeing themselves as mere
agents of shareholders, corporate directors and professional executives-
who usually worked for fixed fees and owned relatively little stock in the
company-viewed themselves as stewards or trustees charged with guid-
ing a vital social and economic institution in the interests of a wide range
of beneficiaries.'0 Certainly they looked out for investors' interests, but
they looked out for the interests of employees, customers, and the nation
as well.
The system was hardly perfect. " But the proof of the pudding is the
tasting. Judged by that standard, managerial capitalism seemed to gener-
ate good results. American corporations dominated the global economy,
producing innovative products for their consumers, secure jobs for their
employees, and corporate tax revenues for their government. And-
especially notable-they produced outstanding investment results for
public shareholders. Between 1933 and 1976 (a period that includes the
infamous bear market of 1973-1974),12 shareholders who invested in the
S&P 500 enjoyed inflation-adjusted compound average annual returns of
7.5%. 13 This compares very favorably indeed with the sorts of returns
shareholders have received more recently. 14
In other words, managerial capitalism worked surprisingly well for
dispersed and powerless shareholders. To understand why, it is important
to recognize that while neither state nor federal law requires directors to
use their corporate powers to maximize shareholder wealth, it does pre-
vent them from using their powers to maximize their own.' 5 The doctrine
known as the business judgment rule allows disinterested directors and
9. GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: How FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA 63
(2009); see also ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM (1964);
Alfred D. Chandler, The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism, 58 BUS. HIST. REV. 473 (1984).
10. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145 (1932).
II. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) (criticizing
managerial capitalism as leading to excessive concentrations of power).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 22-23.
13. ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM CAN
LEARN FROM THE NFL 63 (2011).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 49-5 1.
15. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (discussing duties of care and loyalty).
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executives to sacrifice corporate profits to pursue any lawful corporate
objective, including creating good jobs, providing quality products, and
protecting creditors.' 6 But the duty of loyalty ensures that when directors
and executives act self-interestedly in a financial sense-when they try to
use their corporate powers to line their own pockets-shareholders can
bring derivative suits in which the burden is on the defendant director or
executive to demonstrate the ultimate fairness of his or her actions.' 7 And
the federal disclosure requirements imposed by the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 made it easier for share-
holder-plaintiffs to identify potential breaches of the duty of loyalty. 18
Thus, during most of the managerialist era, state and federal law
deprived executives and directors of public corporations of opportunities
to use their corporate powers for their own direct financial gain. (The
managerialist era was free from the modern infatuation with "pay for
performance," which has allowed so many contemporary corporate ex-
ecutives to enrich themselves, quite legally, by managing the metrics to
which their pay is tied.)19 Limited in their ability to serve themselves,
directors and executives instead chose to spend a fair amount of their
time and energy serving their firms. 20 At least, that is what seems to have
occurred.2
III. MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM BECOMES VULNERABLE
But by the early 1970s, managerial capitalism began to run into
headwinds. The most challenging may have been the bear market of
1973-1974, during which the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost nearly
half its value. This decline was almost certainly not caused by
managerialism-which after all had been around for decades-but by
President Nixon's decision to abandon the gold standard in 1971, which
triggered inflation, as well as the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, which quad-
16. Id. at 299-305.
17. Id. at 298-99.
18. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-pp).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 40-43.
20. Put differently, during the managerialist era there were relatively few restraints on manag-
ers "shirking" (withholding effort), but there were significant and effective restraints on self-dealing
and other blatant forms of theft.
21. See Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 315-16 ('[C]orporate law seems to presume that so
long as directors are limited in their ability to use their positions to benefit themselves, they may
instead choose to use their positions to benefit others by promoting the joint welfare of all the stake-
holders who together comprise the corporation. ... As untidy as this notion may seem, a parallel
argument has long been accepted as the standard explanation for nonprofit enterprise.").
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The Return ofManagerialism (in the Closet)
rupled oil prices between 1973 and 1974.22 (Imagine the effect on our
economy today if oil were to rise suddenly from its current market price
of $90-$1 10 per barrel to over $400 per barrel.) Nevertheless, the stock
market's poor performance during the early 1970s made it more accepta-
ble to question the efficacy of managerial capitalism. And at least one
influential group--finance economists-was ready to criticize.23
In 1976, economist Michael Jensen and business school dean Wil-
liam Meckling published an article that was destined to become the most
frequently cited paper in the management literature.24 Ambitiously titled
"Theory of the Firm," Jensen and Meckling's article did not view the
"separation of ownership from control" with the cautious optimism that
Berle and Means had expressed four decades earlier.25 To the contrary,
Jensen and Meckling saw the passivity of dispersed shareholders in pub-
lic corporations as a serious weakness that invited professional managers
to neglect shareholders' interests in the pursuit of their own, leading
managers to shirk or even steal from the firm. The result was the dread
"agency costs" whose lurking presence in public corporations has haunt-
ed many finance economists and corporate governance experts ever
26since.
Ideas can matter, and the idea that shareholder powerlessness in
public corporations was a serious problem turned out to be an idea that
mattered quite a lot. In the decades following the publication of Jensen
and Meckling's article, managerial capitalism fell into academic disre-
pute. It was replaced by a new business theory: the theory of "sharehold-
er primacy." According to shareholder primacy theorists, the only legiti-
mate purpose of the corporation was to maximize shareholder value. And
the best way to secure this objective was to make managers more ac-
countable to shareholders, for example by giving shareholders greater
27control over boards or by tying executive pay to share price.
22. OPEC Oil Embargo 1973-1974, DEP'T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milcstones/1969-
1976/OPEC (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
23. See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 81-83 (discussing academic economists' critique of
managcrialism in the 1970s).
24. MARTIN, supra note 13, at II.
25. See generally Jensen & Mcekling, supra note 5.
26. George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 955, 974 n.86 (2007) ("The agency cost problem has been discussed extensively in the legal
and economic literature.").
27. J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 283, 318 (2010) ("Shareholder primacy theory includes two bedrock principles: 1)
maximizing long-term shareholder value is the only legitimate objective of the corporation, and 2)
designing ways to assist shareholders in exerting control . . . will minimize the agency costs that
result from the separation of ownership from control in publicly traded and diffusely held corpora-
tions.").
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IV. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS AND INTEREST-GROUP APPEAL OF
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
The intellectual roots of shareholder primacy lie in finance econo-
mists' claim that shareholders are the ultimate "owners" and sole "resid-
ual claimants" in corporations, which implies that economic efficiency is
served when corporate directors and executives maximize "shareholder
wealth" (typically measured by stock price).28 As others and I have ar-
gued elsewhere at length, these arguments rest on faulty legal assump-
tions.29 Shareholders cannot own corporations because corporations are
legal entities that own themselves. What shareholders really own is a
contract with the corporation, called a "share of stock," which carries
very limited rights. Similarly, corporations are their own residual claim-
ants, with boards of directors enjoying the legal discretion to either retain
the residual or use it to benefit many different groups, including not just
shareholders but also creditors, employees, customers, and the communi-
ty.
30
Nevertheless, however weak the foundations of shareholder prima-
cy theory, it was an idea that was useful to, and quickly taken up by, at
least five influential groups. The first group, at least chronologically, was
other academics. To professors in the classroom, shareholder primacy
offered a simple story about corporate structure and purpose that could
be easily taught to students who innocently asked the complex question,
"what are corporations for?" To tenure-seeking scholars, especially in
law, shareholder primacy provided an elegant and seemingly scientific
explanation of corporations that fit nicely into the law and economics
methodology that, beginning in the 1980s, had begun to dominate elite
law schools. 31 And to empirical researchers, it offered an exceedingly
simple way to measure corporate performance-whether the stock price
went up or down-thus creating a seemingly solid basis for a generation
of work in so-called empirical corporate governance.32
28. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 36-37 (1991).
29. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 15; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002).
30. LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC 36-44 (2012).
31. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 216 (2008) (describing law and economics as "the most successful intel-
lectual movement in the law of the past thirty years").
32. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Prima-
cy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006) (critiquing this approach); Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Crite-
rion for Good Corporate Law, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 43 (2005) (same).
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Second, shareholder primacy ideology proved personally profitable
for activist corporate raiders in the 1980s and then activist hedge funds in
the 1990s and early 2000s.33 These activists typically would buy shares
in a public company, pressure the board to disgorge cash (usually raised
by adding debt, cutting expenses, or selling all or part of the company),
and then sell their interest and move on to the next target. 34 Faced with
incumbent boards' protests that taking on debt, cutting necessary expens-
es, and selling vital assets caused long-term harm to the firm, activists
used shareholder primacy rhetoric to dismiss these protests as the self-
serving claims of entrenched, wayward agents who refused to "unlock
shareholder value. 35
Third, shareholder primacy was eagerly embraced by an interest
group that Yale corporate law expert Roberta Romano has dubbed "poli-
cy entrepreneurs" 36: academics and consultants eager to try their hands at
improving American corporate governance, sometimes for personal prof-
it. For example, influential activist investor Robert Monks created a
business called Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which ranked
individual companies on whether they had "good" or bad" governance
structures and advised institutional investors such as mutual funds and
pension funds accordingly on how to vote the shares in their investment
portfolios.37 (Monks later sold his interest in ISS, presumably for a tidy
profit, to the Thompson Group). 38 Another well-known policy entrepre-
neur is Lucian Bebchuk, a professor at Harvard Law School who re-
ceived national attention by founding "The Shareholder Rights Project."
The project has played a significant role in pressuring many public com-
panies to abandon staggered board structures designed to ward off corpo-
33. See Joe Nocera, Down with Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://www.nytimcs.com/2012/08/1 I/opinion/nocera-down-with-sharcholder-valuc.html (describing
use of shareholder primacy rhetoric by 1980 raider T. Boone Pickens).
34. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1401
(2007) ("Activist hedge funds look for four things in their targets-potential sale of the whole, po-
tential sale of a part, free cash, and cuttable costs.").
35. See Lee Brodie, Carl Icahn Attempting to Unlock Value in CVR Energy, CNBC FAST
MONEY (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46388674 ("Again, Carl Icahn is agitating to un-
lock shareholder value, this time by demanding CVR Energy put itself up for sale,").
36. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
37. About ISS, INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., http://www.issgovernance.com/about (last
visited Nov. 28, 2012); Governance Risk Indicators, INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS.,
http://www.issgovemance.com/grid-intro (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
38. Biography of Robert Monks, NEW SCHOOL, http://www.newschool.edu/scepa/conferences/
2010/US%20Corporation/Monks%20bio.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
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rate raiders and activist hedge funds by making it more difficult to re-
move an incumbent board of directors.
39
Fourth, shareholder primacy ideology proved extremely profitable
for many CEOs and other top corporate executives. During the
managerialist era, professional executives typically received most of
their compensation in the form of flat salaries and modest bonuses that
seem shockingly reasonable compared to the amounts they receive to-
day.40 In 1993, however, Congress amended the tax code to require that
top executives' pay at public corporations be tied to "objective" perfor-
mance metrics in order to be a deductible expense. 41 Shareholder prima-
cy suggested that the obvious metric should be stock price, and stock
price turned out to be something that was relatively easy for executives
to manipulate, at least in the short run.42 Thus, shareholder primacy
thinking led directly in the 1990s and 2000s to skyrocketing executive
pay, increased earnings inequality, and more than a few spectacular ac-
counting frauds.43
Finally, business journalists embraced shareholder primacy rheto-
ric. Like professors in the classroom, journalists wanted a simple story of
corporate purpose that could be easily explained to their readers. The
idea that corporations existed only to maximize shareholder wealth an-
swered that want. Even better, it offered up easily identifiable villains for
the string of spectacular corporate scandals and disasters (Enron,
Worldcom, HealthSouth) that began to receive attention on the front
pages of the newspapers in the late 1990s. The problem was always
39. Illinois Public Pension Fund Opposes Staggered Boards, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribunc.com/2012-08-I 0/business/ct-biz-08I0-chicago-law-2012081_ pensi
on-fund-shareholder-rights-projcct-corporate-govemancc.
40. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2006) (noting that the ratio of CEO pay to average em-
ployee pay rose from 140 times in 1991 to about 500 times in 2003); Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in
Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 23 (noting that while in 1984 equity-
based compensation accounted for 0% of median executive compensation, it accounted for 66% by
2001).
41. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2011).
42. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of
Executive Pay, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (2011).
43. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, and Corporate
Performances: A Post-Enron Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 53, 61-62 (Peter Cornelius & Bruce
Mitchel Kogut eds., 2003) (discussing how stock-based compensation encourages executives to
pursue risky strategies, manipulate accounting figures, and indulge in "earnings management");
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: ihere We've Been, How We Got to Here,
What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 44-45 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Negotiations, Orgs. & Mkts.
Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=561305 (discussing how
equity-based compensation led to unwise acquisitions, increased risk, aggressive accounting, and
even corporate fraud).
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greedy managers taking advantage of the "separation of ownership and
control" to exploit hapless shareholders.44
V. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY'S RAPID ASCENT
This combined enthusiasm for shareholder primacy ideology
among academics, hedge funds, policy entrepreneurs, executives, and
journalists, goes a long way toward explaining how shareholder primacy
managed so swiftly to mature from provocative academic theory to con-
ventional wisdom. After guiding the business world for at least half a
century-arguably, for as long as public companies had existed-the
philosophy of managerial capitalism came to be viewed by many experts
as a dusty relic, an ancient approach that everyone knew (without bother-
ing to look too hard for empirical evidence) had proven a failure. Share-
holder primacy was now the only proper business philosophy. By 2001,
it was possible for Reinier Kraakman and Henry Hansmann, leading cor-
porate scholars from Harvard and Yale law schools, respectively, to con-
clude that "academic, business, and governmental elites" all agreed:
[U]Itimate control over the corporation should rest with the share-
holder class; the managers of the corporation should be charged
with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its
shareholders; other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, em-
ployees, suppliers, and customers, should have their interests pro-
tected by contractual and regulatory means rather than through par-
ticipation in corporate governance; ... and the market value of the
publicly traded corporation's shares is the principal measure of the
shareholders' interests. 5
The shift in philosophy was accompanied by significant and paral-
lel shifts in business behavior. In the 1990s and early 2000s, shareholder
primacy ideology led to a number of individually modest but collectively
significant changes in corporate law and practice that had the practical
effect of driving directors and executives in public corporations to focus
on share price as their guiding star. These changes included the tax
code's imposition of "pay for performance" requirements (mentioned
above); changes in various SEC rules intended to increase the power of
hedge funds and other activist investors so as to enhance director "ac-
44. See, e.g., Daniel Akst, Why Rules Can't Stop Executive Greed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2006),
www.nytimcs.com/2006/03/05/business/yourmoncyO5cont.html.
45. Henry Hansmann & Rcinicr Kraakman, The End of Histotyfor Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439,440-41 (2001).
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countability"; 46 and activist-driven changes in governance patterns in
public firms, including many large companies' removal of staggered
board structures that had insulated incumbent directors from electoral
challenge.47
Equally important, shareholder primacy values were internalized as
the dominant norms of a rising generation of business leaders, investors,
academics, journalists, and lawmakers.48 Shareholder primacy became
dogma: an omnipresent belief system that was seldom questioned, rarely
justified, and so widely accepted that many of those who embraced it
could not even recall when they first encountered it.
VI. SIGNS THAT SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IS FAILING
Shareholder primacy thinking has changed public corporations.
Shareholders now have more influence over boards, and executives now
are more focused on share price, than at any time in business history.
According to shareholder primacy theory, this shift should have signifi-
cantly improved corporate performance and significantly increased in-
vestors' returns from holding public equity. What have been the actual
results?
Despite the rapid ascent of shareholder primacy, from arcane eco-
nomic theory in the 1970s to dominant business philosophy in American
public firms by the end of the 1990s, the objective results have been dis-
appointing at best. Shareholder primacy may have enriched some CEOs
and hedge fund managers. But it seems to have done little or nothing for
the dispersed shareholders whom it was supposed to benefit. Roger Mar-
tin has calculated that between 1933 (the year after The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property was originally published) and 1976 (the year
Jensen and Meckling's article on agency costs appeared), shareholders
who invested in the S&P 500 enjoyed real compound average annual
returns of 7.5%. After 1976, this average dropped to 6.5%. 49 The down-
ward trend is even more obvious after 2000. We are now entering our
second "lost decade" of low or nonexistent investor returns from holding
46. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1274-83 (2008) (cataloging changes that have increased shareholders' influence over
boards).
47. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Mar. 20, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-ease-against-staggered-boards/ (noting
a dramatic decline in staggered boards as a result of pressures from policy entrepreneurs).
48. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1529 (2007) (stating that by
the late 1900s, "the maximization of shareholder value as the core test of managerial performance
had seeped into managerial culture").
49. MARTIN, supra note 13, at 63.
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shares in public companies.50 Over the past three decades, bonds have by
some measures outperformed stocks as investments for the first time in
nearly 150 years.5'
Meanwhile, public corporations themselves are disappearing. The
total number of corporations filing tax returns in the United States in-
creased by more than 20% between 1997 and 2008.52 But consulting firm
Grant Thornton reports that during this same period the number of com-
panies publicly listed on U.S. exchanges declined by nearly 40%, from
8,823 to 5,401." 3 Public companies are disappearing because some are
failing and being acquired by rivals (consider the financial sector in
2008), while other formerly public companies (Dunkin' Donuts, Toys
"W" Us) are going private. 54 In fact, the life expectancy of companies in
the S&P 500 has declined from around fifty to seventy-five years in the
middle of the twentieth century, to only about fifteen years today.55 At
the same time, many emerging enterprises are avoiding IPOs, preferring
not to sell shares to public investors.56 If the American public corporation
were a species, we would label it endangered.57
Correlation is not causation, of course. Yet there is ample reason to
believe that the rise of shareholder primacy has played a role both in di-
50. MARTIN J. PRING ET AL., INVESTING IN THE SECOND LOST DECADE: A SURVIVAL GUIDE
FOR KEEPING YOUR PROFITS UP WHEN THE MARKET Is DowN (2012).
51. Cordell Eddings, Say What? In 30-Year Race, Bonds Beat Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 31,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 1-10-3 I/bonds-beating-u-s-stocks-over-30-years- for-
first-time-since-I 9th-ccntury.html.
52. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2012, at tbl. 744 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compcndia/statab/2012/tables/
l2s0744.pdf.
53. David Wcild & Edward Kim, Grant Thornton LLP, A Wake-Up Call for America, CAPITAL
MARKET SERIES, Nov. 2009, at I, available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%/20com
panics%20and%20capital%20markcts/gtwakeupcall _.pdf.
54. Thomas Heath, Dunkin' Donuts Brings Private Equity Finns A Sweet Profit, WASH. POST
(Aug 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/value-added-dunkin-brings-private-cquity-firms-a-
sweet-profit/2012/08/1 6/2d82857c-e5dO- IIe 1-8741-940c3f6dbf48_story.html (noting that Dunkin'
Donuts went private in 2005); Parija Bhatnagar, Group to Buy Toys 'R' Us for $6.6B, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 17, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/17/news/fortunc500/toysrus/index.htm (noting Toys
"R" Us was taken private in 2005).
55. See Steve Denning, Peggy Noonan on Steve Jobs and Why Big Companies Die, FORBES
(Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sitcs/stevedcnning/2011/Il/9/pcggy-noonan-on-steve-
jobs-and-why-big-companies-die/.
56. Weild & Kim, supra note 53.
57. See generally The Endangered Public Company, ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21555562. The abrupt and substantial decline in the number of
public companies versus private firms is perhaps the best evidence available to us that the publicly
held firm is becoming a relatively dysfunctional business form. This is because if governance struc-
ture is endogenous (meaning firms can elect to be either public or private, depending on what best
promotes business success) we should not expect to see obvious differences at the individual firm
level between the operational performance of the two types.
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minishing investors' returns, and in shrinking the population of public
companies. The pressure to keep share price high drives public compa-
nies to adopt strategies that harm long-term returns: hollowing out their
workforce; cutting back on product support and on research and devel-
opment; taking on excessive risks and excessive leverage; selling vital
assets; and even engaging in wholesale fraud.58 And the desire to avoid
activist hedge funds and shareholder-value thinking has been cited as a
reason why many companies are going private or staying private.59
Given such disappointing results, it is perhaps not surprising that
the once-hegemonic idea that corporations should be managed solely to
maximize shareholder wealth as measured by stock price has itself re-
cently come under attack. 60 Even Jack Welch, the iconic CEO who ran
GE from 1981 until 2001 and who was one of the first and most vocal
proponents of shareholder primacy, recently described the modern focus
on shareholder value as "the dumbest idea in the world.,
61
The philosophy of shareholder primacy seems poised to fall, per-
haps even more quickly than it ascended. This should hardly be surpris-
ing. After all, shareholder primacy thinking did not evolve from the de-
mands of the business world itself: corporate promoters did not put
stronger shareholder rights in the charters of new firms because they be-
lieved this would allow companies to be run more effectively, nor did
investors shun companies with corporate governance structures that
shareholder primacy enthusiasts deemed "bad., 62 To the contrary, as dis-
cussed below, promoters have responded to the rise of shareholder pri-
macy by structuring the governance rules of new companies to weaken
public shareholders' rights, and investors have eagerly bought shares in
these new companies.
63
Rather than evolving naturally from the collective needs of those
who have a long-term stake in the business world-entrepreneurs, execu-
tives, employees, creditors, and the majority of investors deciding
58. See generally STOUT, supra note 30, at 63-94.
59. Emily Thornton et al., Going Private, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/ 2006-02-26/going-private.
60. See, e.g., Joe Noecra, Down with Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/opinion/noccra-down-with-shareholder-valuc.htm; Steve Denning,
The Dumbest Idea in the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.forbes.eom/sites/stevedenning/201 I/I 1/28/maximizing-sharcholder-value-the-dumbest-
idea-in-the-world/. See generally STOUT, supra note 30.
61. Franeesco Guerrera, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://www.ft.eom/ems/s/0/294ffn f2-0f27- I de-ba I 0-0000779fd2ae.html#axzz25JzTiMrN.
62. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Inves-
tors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 667, 698-702
(2003).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
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whether or not to buy shares-the philosophy of shareholder primacy
was an attempt at top-down "intelligent design" by a small cadre of aca-
demics and policy entrepreneurs. This cadre was aided and abetted by
journalists and hedge fund managers, as well as some CEOs who saw in
shareholder primacy rhetoric a tempting opportunity to increase their
own wealth. The result was a significant shift in the actual practice of
business at large public companies and the adoption of "maximize share-
holder value" as a business mantra. But just as Freidrich Von Hayek
might have predicted,64 this experiment in central planning in corporate
governance has not worked out well. This raises the question: Where will
the American corporation go from here?
VII. MANAGERIALISM RETURNS, IN THE CLOSET
As Yogi Berra supposedly observed, making predictions is always
hard, especially about the future. Predictions are also potentially embar-
rassing if they are not borne out. But to the scientific mind, the very point
of making predictions is to see whether they are borne out or not. If they
are, the theory upon which one bases one's predictions survives for the
moment, perhaps to be tested another day. If one's predictions fail, then
one's theory has been proven false, and it is time for another theory.65
In that spirit, this discussion closes with an observation and with a
prediction. The observation is perhaps obvious: it can be argued that the
theory of shareholder primacy, with its two "bedrock principles" that
corporations should seek to maximize shareholder value and that enhanc-
ing shareholder control in public firms serves this goal,66 has been large-
ly falsified. Shareholder primacy may be elegant and intellectually ap-
pealing. But after thirty years of "improvements" in corporate govern-
ance practices and enhancements in shareholders' rights, there is little or
no evidence to suggest it actually works better, even for the dispersed
shareholders whom it is supposed to serve.67 The predictions of share-
holder primacy theory have not been borne out. Perhaps it is time to
move on to another theory.
The alternative prediction offered here (albeit with caution) is that
American corporations are likely to respond to the disappointments of
shareholder primacy by returning to what worked for more than half a
century: some form of managerial capitalism. Of course, the current gen-
64. See FREIDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
65. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962)
(describing thc process of scientific advancement).
66. Verret, supra note 27.
67. STOUT, supra note 30, at 47-60 (discussing how empirical evidence does not support
shareholder primacy).
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eration of corporate experts has been taught to deplore managerialism for
the supposedly enormous "agency costs" it was assumed (based on re-
markably little evidence) to have unnecessarily generated.68 Thus the
corporate philosophy likely to replace "maximize shareholder value" in
the not-too-distant future is unlikely to be called managerial capitalism.
But it will bear the hallmarks of managerialism. Enormous firms will be
created, and their shares will be owned by dispersed, passive investors
with little or no influence over the firms' affairs. These firms will be run
by professional managers who are almost entirely insulated from share-
holders' demands, whose compensation is based on something other than
share price alone, and who themselves own relatively little of the firns'
equity. And these professional managers-Berle and Means's "techno-
crats"--will often view their objective as something more than maximiz-
ing tomorrow's share price. Rather, they may view the corporation's
purpose as serving the long-term interests of the firm, serving its custom-
ers and employees, or even serving society.
These neo-managerialist firms are already appearing. Fewer private
corporations are opting to go public. But of those that do, an increasing
number are opting to go public with multiple share classes that allow the
finns' founders and executives to retain voting control, while public in-
vestors receive only highly diluted and in many cases functionally value-
less governance rights.69 Google may have started the trend, at least
among technology firms, when it went public in 2004 with a multiclass
structure that reserved voting power primarily for the firm's founders and
executives. It justified this explicitly on the need to allow the firm to fo-
cus on its "number one priority" of "serving our end users., 70 By 2009,
more than 8% of firms going public had multiple classes of shares, and
by 2012 this figure had risen to more than 12%. 7 1 Public investors have
68. Apart from the 1973-1974 bear market discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying
notes 22-23, the other primary basis for critiquing managerialism seems to have been its tolerance
for large conglomerates. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 81-87. It seems clear that "busting up" a conglom-
erate can produce a higher stock market valuation for the firm's component parts, probably because
conglomeration reduces the dispersion of investors' opinions. See Edward Miller, Risk, Uncertainty,
and Divergence of Opinion, 32. J. FIN. 1151, 1162-64 (1977); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premi-
ums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1259-75
(1990). However, there is little evidence that conglomerates were inefficient from an operational
(rather than stock market valuation) perspective.
69. See Adam Brown, Calpers Strategy Could Avoid IPOs with Dual Class Share Structures,
INSIDE INVESTOR REL. (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.insideinvestorrclations.com/articles/ipos-
private-share-markets/I 8938/calpers-could-avoid-dual-class-ipos/.
70. See 2004 Founders' IPO Letter, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/corporate/2004/ipo-
founders-letter.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
71. Thoughts on 1POs with Multi-Class Share Structures, ALLEN LATTA'S THOUGHTS ON
PRIVATE EQUITY, ETC. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.allenlatta.com/I/post/2012/08/thoughts-on-ipos-
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proven not only willing but eager to buy shares in these firms, including
Kayak, Linkedln, Yelp, and Zillow.72 This trend should continue.
Another form of what might be called closet managerialism that has
appeared is the phenomenon of large private equity firms that are
themselves publicly held-again with multiple share classes that
disempower their public shareholders. An early precursor was Warren
Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway. Berkshire Hathaway is one of the largest
public corporations in the world, and it has been investing in both public
and private firms and turning in excellent results for decades despite a
multiclass structure that effectively disenfranchises its public investors.73
More recently, a number of other large private equity firms have made
initial public offerings, including Blackstone, Carlyle Group, KKR, and
Apollo, all of which sold stock with governance structures that
disenfranchised public investors.74 Some institutional investors have
protested that this is bad corporate governance, but the willingness of
large numbers of other investors to purchase shares in these private
equity firms is remarkable. 75 It suggests, again, that the shareholder-
value ideology that dominates many American public companies has
become dysfunctional, to the point that public shareholders are willing to
with-multi-class-share-structures.html (noting that in 2009 one in twelve IPOs had multiple share
classes and that this year the figure has risen to one in eight).
72. Id. An interesting exception is the recent IPO of Facebook, which has been something of a
failure, suggesting that public investors are willing to hold shares in managerialist firms only when
they in fact have confidence in the skills and faithfulness of the firm's professional managers. See
Walter Hamilton & Jessica Guynn, Is Mark Zuckerberg in Over His Hoodie as Facebook CEO?,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/17/business/la-fi-zuckerberg-
future-20120817; see also Analytical Chemist, Booking First Class, Stuck in Steerage: Beware the
Dangers of Dual-Class Stocks, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 13, 2012), http://seekingalpha.com/article/
803661 -booking-first-class-stuck-in-steerage-beware-the-dangers-of-dual-class-stocks (emphasizing
the importance of management quality in multiclass firms).
73. Justin Sharon, Do Dual-Class Stocks Make for Second Class Shareholders?, MINYANVILLE
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.minyanville.com/trading-and-investing/stocks/articles/dual-class-
stocks-stocks-facebook-ipo/8/22/2012/id/43394 (discussing the examples of Facebook and Berkshire
Hathaway).
74. See Steven M. Davidoff, In Private Equity IP.O., a Shareholder Fear of Losing Favor,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 12, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com2012/03/13/in-pfivate-equity-
i-p-o-a-shareholder-fear-of-losing-favor/ (discussing recent IPOs of Carlyle and KKR, and noting
that Carlyle and others sold only shares with reduced voting rights to the public); Companies Where
Shareholders Have No Power- At All, 24/7 WALL ST. (June 4, 2012), http://247wallst.com/2012/06/
04/companies-where-sharcholders-havc-no-power-at-all/ (noting that Blackstone has dual-class
structure); Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Final Prospectus (initial public offering) (Mar. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/I 411494/000119312511082478/d424b4.htm
(noting limited share voting rights).
75. See Brown, supra note 69 (discussing Calpers pension fund's objections to dual-class struc-
tures). Similarly, although many institutional investors argue that staggered board structures that
make it more difficult for shareholders to remove directors are "bad" corporate governance, an in-
creasing percentage of firms going public are adopting staggered boards. Davidoff, supra note 47.
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pay the cost of hiring intermediaries and give up virtually all their
governance rights to have a chance of investing in private companies
instead.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Far more than we realize, our affairs and our behavior are influ-
enced by beliefs about the world we form not from our own observations
and experiences, but from what our teachers and peers have repeatedly
told us must be so. 76 Sometimes what we learn from teachers and peers
turns out to be useful and accurate-consider the periodic table of ele-
ments, for example. But sometimes, especially with regard to social insti-
tutions like markets and corporations, the ideas we absorb from others
about how these institutions work can turn out to be perilously unteth-
ered from reality.
Like the supposed economic superiority of communism (an idea
that much of the world once embraced), the business philosophy of
shareholder primacy is an example of just such an untethered yet influen-
tial idea. Hatched in the ivory tower, it escaped into the larger world
where it was nurtured by a few small but powerful interest groups, in-
cluding hedge fund activists and some CEOs who saw opportunities for
personal gain from promoting it. Within a few decades, it had become so
widely accepted that anyone who dared to question it ran the risk of be-
ing accused of delusion, self-interestedness, or worse.
Yet no matter how passionately a theory may be embraced for a pe-
riod of time, ideas that are not firmly grounded in the realities of the
world-including ideas about business that are not grounded in the reali-
ties of business-are doomed to fail. Communism failed as an economic
system, in both the Soviet Union and China. (Although the so-called
Communist Party governs China, it has embraced "capitalism with Chi-
nese characteristics.")17 Similarly, a corporate sector premised on the
notion that corporations are run well when. they are run to "maximize
shareholder value" may be doomed to fail, if it is not failing already. We
do not know with certainty what system will rise to replace it. But one
strong candidate is some form of managerial capitalism. After all, busi-
76. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY
(1936) ("The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they arc right and when they
are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. . . . Practical men, who believe them-
selves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, arc usually slaves of some defunct econ-
omist.").
77. See generally YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS:
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE (2008).
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ness history suggests that it has the potential to actually work, for inves-
tors and perhaps for the rest of us as well.
